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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BETTY S. CHRISTENSEN,
DOCKET NO. 35169
Appellant,
vs.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
ST A TE INSURANCE FUND,
Respondent.

APPELLANTS'BRIEF
Appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission.
Hearing Office Rinda Just presiding.
Michael J. Verbillis
Residing at Coeur d'Alene, ID for Appellants.
Paul J. Augustine
Residing at Boise, ID for Respondent.
Thomas W. Callery, Esq.
Residing at Lewiston, ID for Respondent.
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III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case. This is Worker's Compensation case appealed from the Industrial

Commission ("the Commission"), involving two injuries, four days apart, to Betty Christensen,
which occ1med on December 5 and December 9, respectively, 2002. Hearing was held before the
Industrial Commission hearing officer on November 29, 2006. Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law were entered by the Commission on November 20, 2007.

Thereafter, an Order on

Reconsideration was entered by the Commission on March 30, 2008.
11.

Course of the Proceedings. The Commission below approved the recommended Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Referee Rinda Just that Claimant had not met her burden of
establishing that her accepted injuries of 2005, combined with her previous impairments and
disability to render her totally and permanently disabled.
111.

Statement of the Facts. At the time of the hearing, Betty Christensen was a 47 year old

single mom with grown children. She had graduated from high school and had worked in various
entry level jobs including electronic assembly and daycare, before completing post secondary
schooling to become a medical assistant and medical secretary, which field she worked in steadily
for approximately 12 years until she suffered a significant injury to her right leg in 1992. Tr. p. 96 -

Tr. p. 99, Claimant's Exhibit 8.
The 1992 injury was also marked by complications owing to a disease which coincidently
was diagnosed while Betty was healing from this right lower leg injury. This disease was known as
Charcot Marie Tooth Disease, which is characterized as a severe degenerative neurological illness
affecting the distal lower extremities. She underwent a triple fusion of her right a11kle in Seattle,
Washington due to the injury and the effects of the disease. Tr. p. 73, !. 20 - p. 34 !. 8.
The 1992 injmywas characterized by her friend and physician, as one that clearly constituted
a hindrance or obstacle to resumption of employment. Tr. p. 39, l. 23 - p. 40, /. 2. As a consequence
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of the 1992 injury and its sequalae, Betty withdrew from full-time work and applied for Social
Security. Tr. p. l 05, l. 25 - p. l 06, l. 1.
The injuries of record that have been accepted by the Defendant/Employer, the State
Insurance Fund, took place, as previously indicated, four days apart, the first on December 5, 2002
and the second on December 9, 2002. Both injuries are marked by one unifying theme. Betty
Christensen was attempting to avoid injury to patients that she was caring for in her job with S.L.
Start, where she was working as a community support specialist. In the first, she was attempting to
assist a patient being lifted out of a bus who was paralyzed from the waist down. During the
transfer, she injured her back and right leg and lower extremity when the weight from the gait belt
pulled her in this awkward position toward the patient. Tr. p. I I 5, l. l - p. I I 7, l-5. Four days later,
while assisting another client, who was about to faint, she injured herself in trying to prevent injury
to this client, who had become light headed while entering the hospital.

She immediately

experienced severe pain in the right shoulder, the neck, lower back, across both hips, and down the
right leg. Tr. p. 118, l. IO - p. 119, I. I 8.
The treatment for these two injuries consisted of surgery to her right great toe and shoulder
surgery. She had also been worked up by a neurosurgeon for complaints in her low back, but was
felt by her attending physician to not be a surgical candidate. Ultimately, her attending physician,
Dr. Carraher, issued a combined rating of 18%, giving various values for the surgically fused foot,
the shoulder difficulty and her low back impairment. Plaintiff's Exhibit I, p. 10-11, Tr. p. 41, l.

10- p. 43, l. 19.
Her vocational histo1y, after her hiatus from work and prior to the 2002 injuries, consisted
of approximately 5 years of steady, albeit part time employment in the medical community. Her
resume is documented by exhibit (Claimant's Exhibit 8), which lists the several jobs that she held
on a part time basis between July of 1997 through February of 2002. These jobs include medical
assistant, office nurse, patient care, assisting with minor procedures, and a variety of medically
related jobs in the Coeur d'Alene medical community. Id. Not one of these jobs was full time and,
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as indicated previously, Betty had been receiving Social Secu1ity. Under applicable Social Security
rules and regulations, Betty was allowed to earn as much as $700 per month in part time work and
still obtain her Social Security. 20 CFR §404.1744(b)(Il)(ii)(B). Betty Christensen has not returned
to any employment, part time or full time, since the 2002 injuries.
Vocational experts testified on both sides of this case, as well as a Physical Therapist who
performed a physical capacities exam (P.C.E.). Mark Bengtson, a physical therapist with Summit
Rehabilitation Associates, testified that Claimant could not sustain even a 4 hour sedentary workday
on a sustained basis. Deposition Transcript, Mark Bengtson, p. 47, Ins. 11-14.

Claimant's

vocational expert, Tom Moreland, opined that, based upon his review of the medical evidence,
including Mr. Bengtson's testimony, that Betty Christensen had lost the residual capacity to even
engage in the work she had enjoyed pre-accident; to wit part time employment. The defense made
the argument that Betty Christensen was already totally disabled based upon the ravages of her 1992
injury and the impact of the Charcot Marie Tooth Disease, notwithstanding the fact that Betty was
actively involved in the workforce for 5 years as a valuable member of the medical community
before being injured at S.L. Start.
From this evidence, the hearing officer concluded, and the Commission agreed, that Betty
Christensen was already totally disabled before her 2002 injury and was, thus, not entitled to
disability benefits. As an epilogue to the hearing, the Undersigned filed a Motion to Reconsider
asking that the Commission award impairment based upon the essentially undisputed evidence of
her treating physician. The Referee, again, concurred by the Commission, determined that the
opinions of the consultants retained by the Defendant were more precisive and, accordingly, no
impairment was awardable. R. pp. 67 - 70.
IV.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

Whether the Commission erred by not following the teachings of Page vs. McCain

Foods, Inc., docket no. 33158, requiring a two-tiered analysis of disability.
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2.

Whether application of the Hamilton - Bybee Doctrine. in this case was properly

invoked?
3.

Whether the Hamilton - Bybee Doctrine should be overruled by this Court?

V.
DISCUSSION
1.

Introduction.

The central issue in this case revolves around whether or not a person is receiving Social
Security disability benefits and working part-time can become eligible for total and permanent
disability benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act. The standard to be utilized by this Court
regarding evidentiary issues is very familiar. This Court will not reweigh the evidence or the
credibility thereofrelied upon by the Commission and it will not disturb any findings regarding the
weight and credibility unless they are clearly erroneous. Hutton vs. Manpower, Inc., 143 Idaho 73,
149 P.3d. 848 (2006). This Court, however, exercises free review over legal issues. Id.
In this case the Claimant contended she was totally disabled on the basis of the odd lot
doctrine. It is thus governed by the provisions of Idaho Code §72-332(1), which provides:
Payment for second injuries from industrial special indemnity account. - (1) If
an employee who has a pennanent physical impainnent from any cause or origin,
incurs a subsequent disability by an injury or occupational disease arising out of and
in the course of his employment, and by reason of the combined effects of both the
pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury or occupational disease or by
reason ofthe aggravation and acceleration of the pre-existing impairment suffers total
and pen11anent disability, the employer and surety shall be liable for payment of
compensation benefits only for the disability caused by the injury or occupational
disease, including scheduled and unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured
employee shall be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the
industrial special indemnity account.
Idaho Code §72-332(1).

This Court has held that the Claimant seeking to obtain contribution from the ISIP must
provide: ( 1) that there was a pre-existing impairment, (2) that the impairment was manifest; (3) that
the impairment was a subject hindrance; and (4) that the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent
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injury in some way combine to result in total and permanent disability. Dumaw vs. JL. Norton

Logging, 118 ldaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 (1990).

2.

The Commission erred by not making separate findings of disability and then
allocating those elements of disability to pre-existing and post accident conditions.
Less than two months following the decision of the Referee in this case, the Supreme Court

announced a decision long awaited by Worker's Compensation practitioners. Page vs. McCain

Foods, Inc. (January 2008, Supreme Court docket no. 33158). This case stands for the proposition
that in any worker's compensation case where there is the issue of pennanent disability that may be
impacted in part upon a prior impainnent, as well as the impairn1ent reflective of the injury under
examination, the Commission must engage in a two-tiered analysis. First, the Commission must
make a separate finding as to the degree of pennanent disability from all sources, then the
Commission must apportion that disability between pre-existing injuries and the current injury. Id.
It is evident in this case that the hearing officer did not engage in such an analysis. Indeed, the
hearing officer seemed to have been seemed to have been fixated upon how many hours and how
many dollars the Claimant earned during the five years period of time prior to the accident(s) rather
than analyzing whether or not this was meaningful employment. A proper analysis of the evidence
would have involved a finding of the level of disability of Claimant and a con-esponding assessment
of physical restrictions, limitations and abilities contrasted between her pre-2002 condition and her
condition following the accident(s). For exan1ple, how long could she walk, sit, stand, etc. before
and after the 2002 injury? How much could she lift and/or carry? Then, an analysis as to how those
impairments affected Claimant to earn a competitive wage should have been done ..
It is evident on this record that the Claimant was unable to work in a full time capacity and
could only work in a part time capacity doing sedentary work. That to some would be considered
a substantial disability. Indeed, it is conceded by the Undersigned that such would be an accurate
portrayal of the overall employability of Betty Christensen as of December of 2002.
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Having said that, she was, in fact, engaged in work in a competitive world, even ifit was only
part time. That is what has been taken from her as a result of these last two injuries. There is no
debate that she lacks the capacity to work in any setting; part time, full time, sedentary, etc. What
little ability that she had and what she persevered with is no longer viable.

3.

The Commission Improperly Applied Hamilton - Bybee.
Two cases have come out of the Supreme Comi in the last several years concerning fact

patterns where a previously disabled workerre-enters the workforce and is then injured, only to find
that they can no longer work again. These two cases both focus on the subtleties of the language
appearing in Idaho Code §72-332. Reference is made to the portion of the statute that indicates that
the disability must be from the "combined effects" of the pre-existing impainnent and the
subsequent injury. Hamilton vs. Ted Beamis Logging & Const., 127 Idaho 221, 899 P.2d. 434 (I 995);

Bybee vs. State, Indus. Special Indem., 129 Idaho 76,921 P.2d. 1200 (1996).

It appears as though the underlying analysis in Hamilton and Bybee are that sympathetic
employers do exist. Indeed, Mr. Hamilton went back to work for his previous employer after a
lengthy recuperation following a relatively severe injury that had predated the one that brought him
before the Comi. As the Comi framed the issue, it was obliged to:
Consider whether a Claimant, who was totally and pennanently disabled at the time
ofan industrial accident and employed only because of the sympathy ofhis employer,
is entitled to an award of total disability benefits.
127 Idaho 221 @ 223.

It is clear that the Supreme Court in reversing the Industrial Commission was moved by the
fact that the Claimant had only been offered a job by the employer "because they were friends and
Beamis was attempting to help Hamilton out." 127 Idaho 221 @ 224. This is, indeed, the classic
sympathetic employer.

Bybee vs. State, Indus. Special lndem., supra, involved slightly different but analogous facts
to Hamilton. In Bybee, the Commission had determined that the injured worker, even though she
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was employed at the time of the "second injury," was involved in employment that was "essentially
the equivalent of that of a sympathetic employer or friend." 129 Idaho 76 at 83.

Bybee sets forth the analytical framework for tribunals to follow in analyzing the factors set
forth in Idaho Code §72-332, with particular emphasis on the "combined with" element. In order
for a Claimant to establish odd lot status, per Bybee, he must first demonstrate that he was employed
at the time of his second injmy. Thereafter, the pa1iy seeking to invoke Hamilton must then show
that the Claimant's actual employment was due to "a business boom, the sympathy of a paiiicular
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effo1i on her part." 129 Idaho Code 76
at 129, quoting from Lyons vs. Indus. Special Indem, 98 Idaho 403 at 406. Thus, it appears that this
Court, in analyzing fact patterns where a paiiially disabled worker suffers a subsequent injury and
contends that the combined effects render him totally disabled, will not condone the award of total
and permanent disability benefits if the employment during the second injury was due to the factors
listed above. Id.
Here, there is no evidence in this record that the employment Claimant held with S.L. Start
was due to a business boom, the sympathy of a paiiicular employer, temporary good lnck, or a
superhuman effo1i on her part. Moreover, the fact that she had held five previous jobs where she was
allowed to use a combination of her post secondary education and perseverance to be employed
separates this case rather dramatically from the fact patterns in Hamilton or Bybee. Her lengthy
employment record with a variety of employers and letters of recommendation take Betty
Christensen's case out of the Hamilton - Bybee context.

It appears as though the hearing officer improperly analyzed the combined with requirement
of Idaho Code §72-332 and based the decision entirely on the fact that the Claimant was only
involved in part-time work and that she was receiving Social Security.
The logic of the hearing officer is somewhat seductive. After all, why should a person on
Social Security seek total and permanent disability benefits? Hasn't that person, in fact, told the
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world that she is unable to work and, hence, is receiving the safety net provided by the Social
Security Administration? The answer is yes and no.
As previously mentioned, the Social Security system in this country recognizes that certain
workers should have the right to earn a modest amount of money on a monthly basis and not be
deemed disqualified from Social Security benefits. As mentioned, infra, $700 a month at times
material was the threshold amount that the Social Security Administration deems as "substantial
gainful activity" within the meaning of the federal statutory scheme and the regulations interpreting
the same.
Against the implicit suggestion that Betty Christensen would be "double dipping" by
receiving Social Security and total and pennanent disability benefits consider the fact that the
amount of benefits she shall receive would be greatly capitated in her case owing to her previous
average monthly earnings. This ceiling is part and parcel of the entire fabric of the Worker's
Compensation Act in this state.
As the Undersigned attempted to point out to the tribunal below, the fact that Betty was on
Social Security and that she would attain a markedly reduced amount of disability benefits were she
to prevail below is already punislnnent enough, if you will, for the fact that she wasn't "fully"
employed.
The Worker's Compensation Act has within it numerous seemingly arbitrary caps on
benefits. First of all, unless a person is totally and pennanently disabled, a person that is severely
injured will only receive compensation for a percentage of 500 weeks. Thus, the 20 year old person
with a below knee amputation receives the same amount as the 65 year old worker with the same
injury, even though the 20 year old person has a longer time to endure his disability. Idaho Code
§72-426, 428.
Additionally, there is a cap on the monetary amount a person can receive as a percentage of
his previous earnings. Thus, even if a person was earning over $100,000, such as a Supreme Court
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Justice, that person, when receiving worker's compensation, would only get a portion of the average
state wage, which is somewhere in the neighborhood of $32,000. Idaho Code §72-409.
Thus, there are seemingly arbitrary limits of the amount of and dnration of impairment and
disability payments that can be received by an injured workers. Betty Christensen's life plays into
this drama in the sense that she would only receive a bare minimum of worker's compensation
benefits were she to have prevailed below.
Indeed, Betty Christensen will receive no more than 45% of the average weekly wage and
it is possible that she could be receiving somewhere between 15% of the state wage and 45%. As
of October of 2005, the average weekly state wage in Idaho was $543.

4.

Hamilton and Bybee Should be Overruled.
The Hamilton/Bybee Doctrine, as is has become known by practitioners of worker's

compensation, is a modem anachronism. It stands for the proposition that the safety net granted to
employers in the form ofidaho Code §72-332 and, coincidentally, to employees, is really not there.
Anyone who attempts to pull himself up by the bootstraps, tum off Oprah and get a job, is subject
to being found to be a total by an ex post facto ruling of a referee.
There must be some line that can be drawn between the superhuman effort of an employer
that re-enters the workplace following a partially disabling injury and the bittersweet finding by a
tribunal, several years after the fact, that that person was deemed to be a "walking total." The
Undersigned would propose a modification of the Hamilton - Bybee Doctrine. This modification
would bar the employer who has knowingly employed a partially disabled worker from asserting odd
lot status in the event of a subsequent injury. After all, that employer benefitted from the labor of
the partially disabled employee, as do all other employers in this State. Moreover, the Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund should likewise be barred from asserting the doctrine.
Such a rule would not be a dramatic departure from the statutory scheme as it exists. The
entire statute is written as to the employee who is seeking benefits.
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specifically creates the so-called Hamilton - Bybee defense, save and except the combined with
language in the statute. Idaho Code §72-332.
On such a nan-ow wisp was this judge made defense created. As the dissent in Bybee pointed
out, the Commission based its finding of the sympathetic employer on the basis of expert testimony,
to wit "that only with a sympathetic employer would she be employed." 129 Idaho 76 at 84.
Although Justice Silak's dissent turned on substantial competent evidence, the debate
inherent in Bybee leads one to conclude that Hamilton staiied this Court on a slippery slope in
attempting to over analyze and perhaps give some extra statutory judicial immunity to the Second
Injury Fund. What one finds most galling with this thinly veiled immunity is that there is no sound
policy reason for the saine. The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is created by and maintained by
a tax on worker's compensation settlements. Idaho Code §72-327. This Fund is for the benefit of
those employers that would be otherwise reluctant to hire partially disabled employees and ce1iainly
for the benefit of those employees who seek work with a disability.
This Court has done a disservice to the working men and women of this State who have
attempted to re-enter the workforce following severe injuries. It is time to put ai1 end to this injustice
with a bright line ruling that creates estoppel principles with respect to which party can assert the
combined with element. Having written the foregoing, the Undersigned is soberly aware that the
purported judicial activism of Justice Trout in the Hamilton and Bybee decisions may well be
i11terpreted by this Court as simply thoughtful analysis of the statute.
The response would be that the hallmark of the Worker's Compensation Act is so that the
statute can provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen ai1d their families." Idaho Code
§72-332.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the Commission erred in the first instai1ce by
not following the recently announced two-tiered ai1alysis of disability and, more profoundly, by
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improperly fitting this case into the Hamilton - Bybee rubric. This Court is further invited to discard
into the trash can of history the holdings of Hamilton and Bybee.
Respectfully submitted this..:]_ day of
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